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Essentialist Modal Rationalism  
In my recent book Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, I proposed a principle linking 
rational coherence and metaphysical possibility, as part of an argument against physicalism. 
Although it was not the focus of concern in this book, I had hoped that that principle might 
undergird a generalised account of our knowledge of modality. I have subsequently realised, 
however, that that principle has limited application, in a way that conflicts with these 
broader ambitions. In this paper I will outline these limitations and propose ways of 
overcoming them. The result I hope, is the bare bones of an account of how our knowledge 
of metaphysical modality is grounded in our capacity to discern whether or not a 
proposition is rationally coherent. 
In section I, I will give a brief overview of the view I defended in Consciousness and 
Fundamental Reality. In section II I will explain its limitations and propose a way of resolving 
them.  
I 
It used to be thought that rational coherence and metaphysical possibility went hand in 
hand, something we can capture with the following principle: 
Simple Modal Rationalism – For any proposition P, P is rationally coherent (where a 
proposition is rationally coherent just in case it can’t be ruled out a priori) iff there is 
a metaphysically possible world at which P is true.  
Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1973) put a spanner in the works by proposing examples of 
propositions which seem to violate this principle, such as <water is XYZ>.1 We cannot know 
a priori that water is not XYZ, and yet there is no genuine possibility corresponding to this 
state of affairs. In Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, I proposed a nuanced form of 
modal rationalism consistent with the Kripke-Putnam counterexamples to Simple Modal 
Rationalism. The rough idea is that rational coherence entails possibility when you grasp the 
essential nature of what you’re conceiving of. We can call this general approach ‘Essentialist 
Modal Rationalism’. 
                                                     
1 Kripke 1980, Putnam 1973. 
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Water is essentially H2O and it is thus not possible for it to be XYZ. Why then is it coherent 
to suppose that water is XYZ? The reason is that the concept <water> does not reveal the 
essential nature of water. When conceiving of water as ‘water’ we don’t conceive of it in 
terms of its essential nature (being composed of H2O molecules) and thus it is coherent to 
suppose that it has some other essential nature (being composed of XYZ molecules). 
According to the modal rationalism I want to defend, coherence and possibility go together 
when the concepts being employed yield complete understanding of what is being 
conceived of (from hereon, by ‘possibility’ I mean metaphysical possibility).  
In Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, I expressed this in terms of the distinction 
between transparent and opaque concepts, defined as follows: 
 Transparent Concept (1st attempt) – A concept C referring to entity E is transparent 
just in case C reveals the nature of E (i.e., what it is for E to be part of reality is a 
priori accessible for someone possessing C, in virtue of possessing C), for example, 
<sphericity> and <party>. 
 Opaque Concepts – A concept C referring to entity E is opaque just in case C reveals 
little or nothing about the nature of E, for example, <water> and <gold> (Goff 2017: 
74). 
For sphericity to be part of reality (by being instantiated2) is for there to be something with 
all points on its surface equidistant from its centre; for someone possessing the concept of 
sphericity, this can be known a priori. For water to be part of reality is for there to be 
something composed of H2O molecules; in contrast to the case of <sphericity>, this cannot 
be known a priori in virtue of possessing <water>.  
We are now in a position to give a first attempt at defining a special notion of coherence: 
Transparent Coherence (1st attempt) – For any proposition P, P is transparently 
coherent just in case: 
(i) P contains only transparent concepts, and  
(ii) P is rationally coherent, i.e. the truth of P cannot be ruled out a priori. 
                                                     
2 The form of reality will depend on the kind of entity. For an individual to be part of reality is for it 
to exist; for a property to be part of reality is for it to be instantiated (Platonists might want to 
distinguish a property’s existing from its having concrete reality); for an event to be part of reality is 
for it to take place. 
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Building on this, I defended the following principle linking coherence to possibility: 
Transparency Coherence Principle (1st attempt) – For any proposition P, if P is 
transparently coherent, then P is possibly true. 
And on the basis of this principle, I built a case against physicalism, roughly: 
The Transparency Argument Against Physicalism 
1. Transparency Coherence Principle – For any proposition P, if P is transparently 
coherent, then there is a metaphysically possible world at which P is true. 
2. The proposition <there are zombies> is transparently coherent. 
3. If there is a metaphysically possible world at which <there are zombies> is true, then 
physicalism is false. 
4. Therefore, physicalism is false. 
The defence of premise 2 involved arguing that the concepts involved in <there are 
zombies>, namely physical and experiential concepts, are transparent.  
II 
Accommodating Brute One Offs 
The Transparency Coherence Principle outlined above is a one-way conditional, and as such 
it does not rule out that there are propositions that are possibly true but not transparently 
coherent (in the sense defined above). If there are such propositions, and we know that 
they are possibly true, then we cannot account for our knowledge of their possible truth in 
terms of our knowledge of their transparent coherence (because ex hypothesi they aren’t 
transparently coherent, at least not in the above sense). And hence, if we want a general 
account of our modal knowledge in terms of our knowledge of transparent coherence, then 
we need the Transparency Coherence Principle in a biconditional form: 
Biconditional Transparency Coherence Principle – For any proposition P, P is 
transparently coherent iff P is possibly true.3 
                                                     
3 If we specifically want to account for our modal knowledge, then strictly speaking all we need is the 
following principle: For any proposition P, P is transparently coherent iff P is known to be possibly 
true. However, I can’t see that this further qualification will make much difference to the discussion.  
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Unfortunately, so long as we are understanding rational coherence as defined in section 1, 
there are counterexamples to the above principle. To explain why, we need to introduce 
some more terminology. Let us say that an entity has a ‘defining nature’ just in case it is 
possible to understand what it is for that specific entity to be part of reality. Kinds (e.g. 
water) and properties (e.g. sphericity) seem to have defining natures; we can grasp what it 
is for these things to be instantiated. But it is not clear that particular individuals, such as a 
particular electron E, have defining natures. E falls under a kind – the kind electron – and 
that kind has a defining nature. But there is nothing to be grasped about what it is for E, as 
opposed to some other electron, to exist. In this sense, particular individuals are ‘brute one 
offs.’ (Or at least that is how it seems. Perhaps particular individuals do have defining 
natures but grasping them is beyond our ken. Perhaps God knows each thing in terms of its 
defining nature).  
For any entity that lacks a defining nature, the notion of a transparent concept of that entity 
gets no purchase. If there is nothing to grasp about what its reality consists in, then there 
can’t be a concept that reveals what its reality consists in. This leads to difficulties for the 
Biconditional Transparency Coherence Principle. Let us assume that a human individual 
lacks a defining nature.4 Now consider the proposition <Lewis Carroll exists but Karl Marx 
does not>. This proposition is both coherent and possibly true. But it is not transparently 
coherent, as it contains opaque concepts. Nor is it possible to replace the non-transparent 
concepts involved with co-referring transparent concepts, given that these concepts denote 
entities that lack defining natures. Thus, we have a genuine possibility – the possibility of 
Lewis Carroll existing without Karl Marx – which does not correspond to a transparently 
coherent proposition. 
In Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, I tried to circumnavigate this problem simply by 
focusing on those propositions which are rationally coherent in the above sense and 
defining the link between coherence and possibility in terms of those propositions. The 
                                                     
4 In fact, it is somewhat plausible that a human person has a defining nature in terms of the sperm 
and egg from which it was formed. In this case, that sperm and that egg will either be brute one offs 
or will also have defining natures in terms of their origins and their DNA. The entities that define 
those origins will either be brute one offs or have defining natures given in terms of their origins. It 
seems plausible to me that as we trace this back at some point we’ll get back to brute one offs. In 
any case, we could simply change the example to avoid this worry (if there are no examples of brute 
one offs, then we can’t change the example, but in that case the problem goes away).  
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problem with this strategy, as stated above, is that it prevents us giving a general account of 
modal knowledge in terms of knowledge of transparent coherence. 
I now think there is a fairly straightforward way of extending the formal definition of 
transparent coherence to avoid this difficulty. The informal idea of transparent coherence is 
that it’s what a proposition has when it reveals to the thinker the full reality of what she is 
conceiving of (when employing the proposition). Now if you don’t know whether or not 
‘Lewis Carroll’ and ‘Karl Marx’ co-refer, then that’s a sense in which you don’t fully grasp the 
state of affairs you’re conceiving of when you entertain the proposition <Lewis Carol exists 
but Karl Marx does not>. For all you know, you might be conceiving of one person existing 
without himself, but equally you might be conceiving of one person existing without some 
other person. In so far as this proposition does not reveal to the thinker that Lewis Carroll is 
distinct from Karl Marx, it fails fully to reveal to the thinker what state of affairs she’s 
conceiving of. 
The obvious way to fill in this knowledge gap is to conjoin the proposition with the true 
information about whether or not Lewis Carroll and Karl Marx are identical. Doing this 
would remove the ignorance discussed in the previous paragraph whilst leaving us with a 
coherent proposition: 
<<Lewis Carroll exists without Karl Marx> & <Lewis Carroll is not identical with Karl 
Marx>> 
Of course, if it had turned out (epistemically) that Lewis Carroll was identical with Karl Marx, 
then adding that information would have produced an incoherent proposition: 
<<Lewis Carroll exists without Karl Marx> & <Lewis Carroll is identical with Karl 
Marx>>5 
Whether or not instances of the above form of proposition are possibly true depends on 
whether or not the entities referred to are identical, and adding this information gives us an 
incoherence in cases where the truth of the original proposition was impossible and a 
coherence in cases where the truth of the original proposition was possible. In other words, 
we’ve brought coherence and possibility back together. 
                                                     
5 I am assuming here that the necessity of identity is a priori. 
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This suggests a way to extend the definition of transparent coherence: 
Transparent Coherence (refined definition) 
 Proposition P is transparently coherent just in case: 
 (i) P is coherent, 
 (ii) In so far as P contains concepts referring to entities with defining natures, those 
concepts are transparent,  
 (iii) In so far as P contains concepts referring to brute one offs B1,B2…Bn: P* is 
coherent, where P* is the proposition formed from conjoining P with true 
information concerning all identities and non-identities between the entities 
involved in B1,B2…Bn. 
With this extended definition of rational coherence, the problem is avoided. The proposition 
<Lewis Carroll exists without Karl Marx> is transparently coherent and corresponds to a 
genuine possibility; the proposition <Lewis Carroll exists without Charles Dodgson> is not 
transparently coherent and does not correspond to a genuine possibility. Exactly the results 
we wanted. 
One might wonder why the modal constraints on brute one offs are confined to facts 
concerning identity/non-identity. In fact, there may well be further modal constraints given 
by the essential kinds brute one offs falls under. If E is essentially a member of the kind 
electron, then E will be an electron in any possible world in which it exists. For E to lack a 
defining nature is for E’s specific identity – its identity over and above the kinds it falls under 
– to be brute: there is nothing to be grasped about what it is for E to exist as opposed to 
some other electron. It follows that the only constraints on E’s identity, beyond being an 
electron, are those given by logic and the necessity of identity. Some may want to analyse 
brute identity in terms of the possession of an individuating property – a haecceity – or a 
substratum. Alternately one may simply accept that there are brute facts about identity and 
non-identity lacking any deeper underpinning. I need not decide between these options for 
my purposes here. 
Accommodating Ostrich Nominalism 
This modified definition of transparent coherence improves on the original by virtue of 
accommodating a new kind of entity: brute one offs. However, it still retains an exclusive 
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focus on entities, which leads to a further difficulty for the Essentialist Modal Rationalism 
we are building upon it. Consider the view David Armstrong mockingly dubbed ‘Ostrich 
nominalism’, according to which there are no properties but there are irreducible facts 
about how entities are. For the Ostrich nominalist, there is no such thing as redness but 
nonetheless roses are red, and there is no such thing as negative charge but nonetheless 
electrons are negatively charged. We might put the view by saying that whilst there are no 
such things as properties, there are such things as propertied objects: red roses, charged 
electrons, etc.  
I have defined transparent concepts as a subset of entity-referring concepts: they are those 
entity-referring concepts that reveal the nature of the entities they refer to. But if there are 
no properties, then there are no entity-referring concepts associated with predicates, and 
hence there are no transparent concepts associated with predicates (given the above 
definition of a transparent concept). And, of course, if there are no such things as 
properties, then we cannot bring in facts about property identity to determine whether a 
coherent proposition is transparently coherent, as instructed in the third clause of the 
refined definition of transparent coherence.  
Why is this a problem? Assume Ostrich nominalism is true. It would follow that essentialist 
modal rationalism would be inconsistent with Kripkean exemptions to Simple Modal 
Rationalism. Consider the proposition: <The material of the golden broach has atomic 
number 8>. This proposition is clearly coherent. And for the reasons discussed above, if 
there are no properties associated with its predicates, then we cannot rule out its 
transparent coherence with reference to the identity of those properties or how they are 
conceived of. Hence, it seems we must conclude that this proposition is transparently 
coherent and, assuming the Biconditional Transparency Coherence Principle, that there is a 
possible world at which it is true.  
For those who accept the Kripkean exemptions to Simple Modal Rationalism, this is the 
wrong result. Strictly speaking, the transparency argument against physicalism would go 
through – as propositions concerning zombies would end up being transparently coherent 
for the same reason – but the victory would be won too easily. We cannot rule out psycho-
physical empirical identities by ruling out all of the standardly accepted instances of 
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empirical identities, such as <water is H2O> and <Gold is the element with atomic number 
79>.  
Of course, we could just assert that essentialist modal rationalism is committed to the 
existence of properties, but this would give the view limited application. A better way 
forward is to find a more nuanced definition of transparent concept such that predicates 
can express transparent concepts even in the absence of properties. This is what I will try to 
do in what follows. 
I take it that, for the Ostrich nominalist, the predicates of true sentences capture something 
about reality, just not something that amounts to the presence or absence of entities.6 
Imagine an Ostrich nominalist world W containing only a red, spherical object. If you only 
know that there is an object in W, then you are partially ignorant about W: you don’t know 
that the object in W is red and round. Your ignorance does not consist in failing to know that 
certain entities exist: there is only one entity and you know that it exists. Nonetheless, your 
ignorance concerns the metaphysical reality of W. 
In other words, for both the Ostrich nominalist and the property realist, there is something 
that is known about reality in knowing that a given predicate, say, charge, truly applies to 
something in the world. For the property realist, knowing what is ascribed by ‘charge’ will 
be a matter of knowing the essential nature of charge; for the Ostrich nominalist, it will be a 
matter of knowing what it is for something to be charged.     
We can perhaps get clearer on this with reference to Theodore Sider’s notion of 
metaphysical truth conditions. The metaphysical truths conditions of a sentence are the 
truth-conditions of S in a perfectly natural language, that is to say a language involving only 
terms that perfectly carve nature at the joints. Metaphysical truth conditions apply to whole 
sentences, but we can think of a specific term in terms of its metaphysical contribution, that 
is to say, the contribution it makes to the metaphysical truth conditions of sentences in 
which it is involved. If ‘negatively charged’ is a perfectly natural predicate, then its 
                                                     
6 This needs to be qualified. Even for an austere nominalist, the successful application of some 
predicates will be a matter of the presence of entities, e.g. ‘is identical with Kripke’. I am here 
focusing on those predicates that property realists take to correspond to perfectly natural 
properties.  
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metaphysical contribution can, in part, be given as follows: For any sentence S of the form ‘X 
is charged’, S is true iff X is negatively charged.  
To know the metaphysical contribution of the predicate ‘negatively charged’ is know what it 
is for something to be charged. Distinct predicates can make the same metaphysical 
contribution; and while some predicates will be a priori associated with their metaphysical 
contribution, others will not. Contrast the following two sentences:  
(A) ‘The table is spherical’ 
(B) ‘The table is as David thinks it is’, where David actually thinks the table is spherical, 
and the meaning of the predicate is such that its metaphysical contribution across all 
possible worlds is determined by how David actually thinks the table is (i.e. it is the 
non-referential analogue of a rigid designator).  
In both cases, the metaphysical contribution of the predicate is the same, but in the former 
but not the latter case someone who understands the predicate has a priori access to its 
metaphysical contribution. The person asserting sentence A knows what they are claiming 
about reality, whereas the person asserting sentence B may not.  
In this way, we can give a definition of transparent concept such that a predicate can 
express a transparent concept even if it doesn’t refer to a property: 
 Transparent Concept (refined definition) – A term T expresses a transparent concept 
iff T’s metaphysical contribution is a priori accessible.7 
With the refined definitions of transparent coherence and transparent concept, and a 
biconditional version of the Transparency Coherence Principle, we now have the resources 
in place to give a robust and highly flexible account of modal knowledge in terms of 
knowledge of coherence.  
I argued in Consciousness and Fundamental Reality that an essentialist account of modal 
rationalism is to be preferred over David Chalmers’ (2009) two-dimensional account of 
modal rationalism, as the former avoids the contentious meta-semantic assumptions 
embedded in the two-dimensional framework. I suppose some philosophers may prefer 
Chalmers’ semantic commitments to the commitments to essence and perfect naturalness 
                                                     
7 The corresponding definition of an opaque concept: A terms T expresses a transparent concept iff 
T’s metaphysical contribution is not a priori accessible.  
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employed in my framework.8 I am persuaded on independent grounds that these latter 
commitments are indispensable but will not repeat these arguments here. For now, I leave 
it to others to decide which of these foundational commitments they find more palatable.9 
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8 One might wonder why we need to bring in a Siderian commitment to perfect naturalness in order 
to capture the idea that a predicate ‘F’ might be a priori associated with what it is for something to 
be F. The problem is that, so long as we are talking loosely, an austere nominalist must surely allow 
that there is a property of Fness, and likewise the property realist must allow talk of ‘what it is for an 
object to be F’. What I want talk of ‘metaphysical truth-conditions’ and ‘metaphysical contribution’ 
to hone in on is the most fundamental relationship between representation and reality, relative to 
various metaphysical theses. It is this that is revealed by a transparent concept, in the case of that 
concept. If austere nominalism is true, then, at the most basic level, ‘X is F’ is true because X is F; 
whereas, if property realism is true, then, at the most basic level, ‘X is F’ is true because X 
instantiates Fness. Perhaps there are other ways to capture this kind of priority than investing in 
perfect naturalness, but it seems to me that something like this commitment is required.  
9 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers and for advice from the editor of this issue, Antonella 
Mallozzi. 
